United Nations Security Council Resolution 338
 | This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page. (Learn how and when to remove these template messages)
|
| UN Security Council Resolution 338 | ||
|---|---|---|
 Territorial changes during the Yom Kippur War | ||
| Date | 22 October 1973 | |
| Meeting no. | 1,747 | |
| Code | S/RES/338 (Document) | |
| Subject | Cease-Fire in the Middle East | |
Voting summary |
| |
| Result | Approved | |
| Security Council composition | ||
Permanent members | ||
Non-permanent members | ||
| ||
United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 was a thee-line resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on 22 October 1973, which called for a ceasefire in the Yom Kippur War in accordance with a joint proposal by the United States and the Soviet Union.[clarification needed] It was passed at the 1747th Security Council meeting by 14 votes to none, with the People's Republic of China abstaining.
The resolution stipulated that the ceasefire should take effect within 12 hours of the adoption of the resolution; that Security Council Resolution 242 be implemented "in all its parts"; and for negations to start between Israel and the Arab states. Fighting continued despite the passing of Resolution 338, and the Security Council passed Resolution 339 soon after. Resolution 340 was passed on 25 October, ending the war.
The "appropriate auspices" was interpreted to mean American or Soviet rather than UN auspices. This third clause helped to establish the framework for the Geneva Conference (1973) held in December 1973.[citation needed]
Adoption of the Resolution
Egypt and Israel accepted the resolution, while Syria, Iraq, and Jordan rejected it.[1][better source needed]
Failure
The ceasefire was breached very soon after the resolution was adopted by the Security Council, with both sides blaming each other for the breach.
 | This section may be confusing or unclear to readers. (May 2024) |
The ceasefire soon violated because Egypt's Third Army Corps tried to break free of the Israeli Army's encirclement. The Egyptian action and the arrival of more Soviet equipment to Cairo permitted Israel to tighten its grip on the Egyptians[2]
On October 22 the superpowers brokered UN Security Council Resolution 338. It provided the legal basis for ending the war, calling for a cease-fire to be in place within twelve hours, implementation of Resolution 242 'in all its parts' and negotiations between the parties. This marked the first occasion the Soviets had endorsed direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel without conditions or qualifications. Golda Meir, the Israeli Ptine Minister, who was not consulted, was offended by this fait accompli, though she had little option but to comply.
Nevertheless, Meir was determined to gain the maximum strategic advantage before the final curtain came down on the conflict. Given the entanglement of the Egyptian and Israeli armies, the temptation was too great for the Israelis to resist. After a final push in the Sinai expelled the Egyptians, Meir gave the order to cross the Canal.
Israel's refusal to stop fighting after a United Nations ceasefire was in place on October 22 nearly involved the Soviet Union in the military confrontation.[3][4][5]
Binding or non-binding issue
| This section may be confusing or unclear to readers. (May 2024) |
The alleged importance of Resolution 338 in the Arab–Israeli conflict supposedly stems from the word "decides" in the third clause, which is held to make Resolution 242 binding. However, the decision in the third clause does not relate to Resolution 242, but rather to the need to begin negotiations on a just and durable peace in the Middle East that led to the Geneva Conference of 1973, which Syria did not attend.[citation needed]
The argument continues; Article 25 of the United Nations Charter says that UN members "agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council". It is generally accepted that Security Council resolutions adopted according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace in accordance with the UN Charter are binding upon the member states.[6][7]
Scholars applying this doctrine on the resolution assert that the use of the word "decide" makes it a "decision" of the Council, thus invoking the binding nature of article 25.[8] The legal force added to Resolution 242 by this resolution is the reason for the otherwise puzzling fact that SC 242 and the otherwise seemingly superfluous and superannuated Resolution 338 are always referred to together in legal documents relating to the conflict.[citation needed]
The more obvious need for the use of Resolution 338 is that it requires all parties to cease fire and states when that should occur, without which Resolution 242 can't be accomplished.[citation needed]
Some scholars have advanced the position that the resolution was passed as a non-binding Chapter VI recommendation.[9][10] Other commentators assert that it probably was passed as a binding Chapter VII resolution.[11] The resolution contains reference to neither Chapter VI nor Chapter VII.
Arab–Israeli peace diplomacy and treaties
- Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (1919)
- Paris Peace Conference, 1919
- 1949 Armistice Agreements
- Camp David Accords (1978)
- Egypt–Israel peace treaty (1979)
- Madrid Conference of 1991
- Oslo Accords (1993)
- Israel–Jordan peace treaty (1994)
- Camp David 2000 Summit
- Israeli–Palestinian peace process
- Projects working for peace among Israelis and Arabs
- List of Middle East peace proposals
- International law and the Arab–Israeli conflict
See also
- Arab–Israeli conflict
- List of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 301 to 400 (1971–1976)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 242
References
- ^ 232. Memorandum of Conversation, Tel Aviv, October 22, 1973, 2:30–4:00 p.m // Arab–Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, р. 662–666
- ^ Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations by Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns (Nov 22, 2002)
- ^ [Academic Journal.Stephens, Elizabeth. "Caught on the hop: the Yom Kippur War: Elizabeth Stephens examines how thirty-five years ago this month the surprise invasion of Israel by Egypt and its allies started the process that led to Camp David." History Today 58.10 (2008): 44+. World History In Context. Web. 1 Mar. 2013.]
- ^ "The Office of the Historian.Arab-Israeli War 1973". Archived from the original on 9 March 2013. Retrieved 22 March 2013.
- ^ The National Security Archive .The October War and U.S. Policy.
- ^ Higgins, Rosalyn, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?, in 21 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 286 1972 pp. 270–266, pp. 285–286
- ^ "Legal Consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)" in [1971] I.C.J. Reports pp. 4–345, pp 52–53
- ^ Rostow, Eugene V. "The Illegality of the Arab Attack on Israel of October 6, 1973." The American Journal of International law, 69(2), 1975, pp. 272–289.
- ^ Adler, Gerald M., Israel and Iraq: United Nations Double Standards – UN Charter Article 25 and Chapters VI and VII (2003) [1]
- ^ Einhorn, Talia, "The Status of Palestine/Land of Israel and Its Settlement Under Public International Law" in Nativ Online No.1 Dec. (2003) [2]
- ^ Kattan, Victor,Israel, Hezbollah, and the use and abuse of self-defence in international law (2006) [3]