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Al-Shabaab (militant group)[edit]

Al-Shabaab is an al Qaeda-affiliated organization that has risen rapidly to prominence in the midst of Somalia’s decades-long anarchy. The group has experienced two dramatic transformations in its short history. Originally the small, youth militia arm of a relatively moderate Islamist organization that rose to power in Somalia in early 2006, Al-Shabaab was radicalized and brought to prominence as a popular Islamist guerilla movement by Ethiopia’s invasion in December of that year. However, since early 2008 Al-Shabaab has undergone yet another transformation, this time from a largely nationalist organization focused on driving out Ethiopia through conventional military means to a hybrid movement that has increasingly embraced transnational terrorism and attempted to portray itself as part of the al Qaeda-led global war against the West.

 Name[edit]

 Al-Shabaab is also known as Ash-Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab ("Party of the Youth"),[1] and Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM) (Arabic: حركة المقاومة الشعبية فى بلاد الهجرتين).[2] For short, the organization is referred to as HSM, which stands for "Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen". The term Shabaab means "youth" in Arabic, and the group should not be confused with similarly named groups. The full official and common name of the group is Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen and the organization has dropped the name of Ash-Shabaab making the current article inaccurate. Another name that some identify this organization by is Hizbul Shabaab or Ash- Shabaab. Some also refer to the group as their shortened name of HSM coming from their common name.

 Organization and leadership[edit]

 Al-Shabaab's composition is multiethnic, with its leadership positions mainly occupied by Afghanistan- and Iraq-trained ethnic Somalis and foreigners.[3] According to the National Counterterrorism Center, the group's rank-and-file members hail from disparate local groups, sometimes recruited by force.[4] Unlike most of the organization's top leaders,[5] its foot soldiers are primarily concerned with nationalist and clan-related affairs as opposed to the global jihad. They are also prone to infighting and shifting alliances.[4] According to the Jamestown Foundation, al-Shabaab seeks to exploit these vulnerabilities by manipulating clan networks in order to retain power. The group itself is likewise not entirely immune to local politics.[5] More recently, Muslim converts from neighbouring countries have been conscripted, typically to do undesirable or difficult work.[6]

Although al-Shabaab's leadership ultimately falls upon al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, the internal leadership is not fully clear, and with foreign fighters trickling out of the country, its structure is increasingly decentralized. Ahmed Abdi Godane was publicly named as emir of al-Shabaab in December 2007.[7] In August 2011, Godane was heavily criticized by al-Shabaab cofounder Hassan Dahir Aweys and others for not letting aid into the hunger-stricken parts of southern Somalia. Although not formally announced, Shabaab was effectively split up into a "foreign legion," led by Godane, and a coalition of factions forming a "national legion" under Aweys. The latter group often refused to take orders from Godane and the two groups hardly talked to each other. In February 2012, Godane made Bay'ah, or an oath of allegiance, to al-Qaeda. With it, he likely hoped to reclaim and extend his authority and to encourage foreign fighters to stay. This move will further complicate the cooperation with the "national legion" of al-Shabaab.[8] Godane was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Somalia on September 1, 2014.[9] Ahmad Umar was named Godane's successor on 6 September 2014, he is believed to have previously played a role in al-Shabaab's internal secret service known as Amniya.[10]

   

 Leaders[edit]

Other leaders:

Mukhtar Robow ("Abu Mansoor"), the Second Deputy Leader of al-Shabaab

 History and activities[edit]

While Al-Shabaab previously represented the hard-line militant youth movement within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU),[30] it is now described as an extremist splinter group of the ICU. Since the ICU's downfall, however, the distinction between the youth movement and the so-called successor organization to the ICU, the PRM, appears to have been blurred. Al-Shabaab had recently begun encouraging people from across society, including elders, to join their ranks. Al-Shabaab has areas of operation in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Yemen.In February 2012, Fu'ad Mohamed Khalaf Shongole, the chief of awareness raising of al-Shabaab, said that "At this stage of the jihad, fathers and mothers must send their unmarried girls to fight alongside the (male) militants". The addition of elders and young girls marks a change in the movement, which had previously involved only men, particularly young boys.[31]

Their core consisted of veterans who had fought and defeated the secular Mogadishu faction leaders of the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) at the Second Battle of Mogadishu. Their origins are not clearly known, but former members say Hizbul Shabaab was founded as early as 2004. The membership of al-Shabaab also includes various foreign fighters from around the world, according to Islamic hardliner Mukhtar Robow "Abu Manssor".[32]

In January 2009, Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia and al-Shabaab carried on its fight against former ally and Islamic Courts Union leader President Sharif Ahmed, who was the head of the Transitional Federal Government.[33] Al-Shabaab saw some success in its campaigns against the weak Transitional Federal Government, capturing Baidoa, the base of the Transitional Federal Parliament, on January 26, 2009, and killing three ministers of the government in a December 3, 2009 suicide bomb attack on a medical school graduation ceremony.[34]

Before the drought in 2010, Somalia, including the al-Shabaab-controlled areas, had its best crop yield in seven years. Al-Shabaab claimed some credit for the success, saying that their reduction of oversized cheap food imports allowed Somalia's own grain production, which normally has high potential, to flourish.[35] They asserted that this policy had the effect of shifting income from urban to rural areas, from mid-income groups to low-income groups, and from overseas farmers to local farmers. However, in response to the drought, al-Shabaab announced in July 2011 that it had withdrawn its restrictions on international humanitarian workers.[36]

In 2011, according to the head of the UN's counter-piracy division, Colonel John Steed, al-Shabaab increasingly sought to cooperate with other criminal organizations and pirate gangs in the face of dwindling funds and resources.[37] Steed, however, acknowledged that he had no definite proof of operational ties between the Islamist militants and the pirates. Detained pirates also indicated to UNODC officials that some measure of cooperation on their part with al-Shabaab militants was necessary, as they have increasingly launched maritime raids from areas in southern Somalia controlled by the insurgent group. Al-Shabaab members have also extorted the pirates, demanding protection money from them and forcing seized pirate gang leaders in Harardhere to hand over 20% of future ransom proceeds.[38]

Al-Shabaab fighters disengage and lay down arms in September 2012

Despite routinely expelling, attacking, and harassing aid workers, al-Shabaab permits some agencies to work in areas under its control. At the height of its territorial control it implemented a system of aid agency regulation, taxation and surveillance. Where agencies are allowed to operate, this is often due to the desire of al-Shabaab to coopt and materially and politically benefit from the provision of aid and services.[39] Senior aid agency representatives often strongly rejected claims that they talked with al-Shabaab, while aid workers working in al-Shabaab-controlled areas often reported they directly negotiated with the group out of necessity.[40]

Al-Shabaab was known as the most prominent terrorist-organization in Somalia which was succeeded to clear away from the bigger cities of the state by the end of 2013.[41]

While al-Shabaab has been reduced in power and size since the beginning of the Kenya Army's Operation Linda Nchi southern incursion, the group has continued its efforts at recruitment and territorial control. The group maintains training camps in areas near Kismayo in the southern regions of Somalia. One such camp was constructed in Laanta Bur village near Afgooye, which is also where the former K-50 airport is located.[42] On July 11, 2012, Somali federal troops and their AMISOM allies captured the area from the militants.[43]

In October 2017, more than 500 people were killed by twin bomb explosions in Somalia's capital city Mogadishu.[44]

An attack on a hotel in Nairobi, Kenya on January 15, 2019 is attributed to al-Shabaab.[45][46][47]

Transformation of Al-Shabaab[edit]

Beginning in early 2008, Al- Shabaab underwent a series of stark changes. Although it had originally emerged as an Islamist-nationalist guerilla army focused on combating Ethiopian troops within Somalia, over the next two years Al-Shabaab would seek new means by which to sustain itself. During this period, it rapidly transformed itself from a lo- cal movement into an al Qaeda-aligned terrorist group that purportedly seeks to propagate terrorist attacks against Western targets. While the lack of governance in south- central Somalia continues to provide a haven from which Al-Shabaab can operate, the changes the group underwent in this period were driven primarily by an aligning of its interests with al Qaeda core and by the emergence of information and communication technology as an effective means by which to gain support. While Al-Shabaab remains locked in a local conflict with AMISOM and the TFG, the group now appears to be a hybrid of both a nation- ally oriented Somali guerilla army and an internationally oriented, AQ-affiliated terrorist group.[48]

There has been some speculation that al Shabaab was forced to turn to AQ core because of declining popular support. Al Shabaab has, since 2008, undergone a major shift in the public portrayal of its ideology, likely in an at- tempt to court AQ core and their supporters. Elements of the group’s leadership have recast their struggle not as a regional conflict, but as part of the AQ-inspired global war against the West. Since 2008, al Shabaab and its media wing, the al Kata’ib Foundation, have created a number of websites hosting well-produced videos portraying the fighting in Somalia as part of this global conflict.60 These videos intersperse scenes of al Shabaab members in combat with messages from Osama bin Laden and other AQ core leaders, promoting Somalia as an important destination for those wishing to combat the West. Al Shabaab’s rhetoric has increasingly focused on combating the “far enemy” of the United States and the African Union governments it supports in addition to the “near enemy”  of the Transitional Federal Government and allied forces within Somalia.61 While interviews suggest that many of al Shabaab’s troops are “opportunistic” Somali supporters62 who are driven by a combination of intimidation and cash bonuses, a core of committed fighters, many of them foreign, appear to be strongly motivated by this new terrorist ideology. 63 Once a fundamentalist yet ultimately nationally focused organization

  Opposition[edit]

The U.S. has asserted that al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda pose a global threat.[49] Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated that "U.S. operations against al-Qaida are now concentrating on key groups in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa."[50] The other countries who have actively voiced opposition are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Israel, Federal Government, Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland, ASWJ, Uganda, Yemen, Turkey, and then the United States and Somalia which are included. [51]

Complaints made against the group include its attacks on aid workers and harsh enforcement of Sharia law. According to journalist Jon Lee Anderson:

The number of people in Somalia who are dependent on international food aid has tripled since 2007, to an estimated 3.6 million. But there is no permanent foreign expatriate presence in southern Somalia, because the Shabaab has declared war on the UN and on Western non-governmental organizations. International relief supplies are flown or shipped into the country and distributed, wherever possible, through local relief workers. Insurgents routinely attack and murder them, too; forty-two have been killed in the past two years alone.[52]

Shabaab have persecuted Somalia's small Christian minority, sometimes affixing the label on people they suspect of working for Ethiopian intelligence.[53] The group has also desecrated the graves of prominent Sufi Muslims in addition to a Sufi mosque and university, claiming that Sufi practices conflict with their strict interpretation of Islamic law.[54][55] This has led to confrontations with Sufi organized armed groups who have organized under the banner of Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a.[56]

Echoing the transition from a nationalistic struggle to one with religious pretenses, al-Shabaab's propaganda strategy is starting to reflect this shift. Through their religious rhetoric, al-Shabaab attempts to recruit and radicalize potential candidates, demoralize their enemies, and dominate dialogue in both national and international media. According to reports, al-Shabaab is trying to intensify the conflict: "It would appear from the alleged AMISOM killings that it is determined to portray the war as an affair between Christians and Muslims to shore up support for its fledgling cause... The bodies, some beheaded, were displayed alongside Bibles and crucifixes. The group usually beheads those who have embraced Christianity or Western ideals. Militants have begun placing beheaded corpses next to bibles and crucifixes in order to intimidate local populations."[57] In April 2010, al-Shabaab announced that it would begin banning radio stations from broadcasting BBC and Voice of America, claiming that they were spreading Christian propaganda. By effectively shutting down the Somali media they gain greater control of the dialog surrounding their activities.[58]

[59]

Al-Shabaab began as the armed wing[60] of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which later splintered into several smaller factions after its defeat in 2006 by Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the TFG's Ethiopian military allies.[61] The group describes itself as waging jihad against "enemies of Islam", and is engaged in combat against the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Al-Shabaab has been designated as a terrorist organization by Australia, Canada, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.[62][63] As of June 2012, the US State Department has open bounties on several of the group's senior commanders.[64]

Foreign intervention, specifically the December 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, had a profound effect on Al-Shabaab’s rise. The only military force willing to resist the Ethiopians following the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), al Shabaab was able to play on deep-seated Somali antipathy toward Ethiopia to recruit thousands of nationalist volunteers. The invasion also molded the group’s operational strategy, leading it to adopt guerilla tactics as a means of resistance.[65]

 Media[edit]

Al-Shabaab proliferates their propaganda through various media. It operates its own radio station, Radio Andalus, and has acquired relay stations and seized other equipment from private radio stations, including some from the BBC. Presenters broadcast in Somali, Arabic, Swahili and English.[66] Besides radio, the Internet is the most heavily utilized by al-Shabaab and other militant Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda because it is the easiest and most cost-effective way to reach a large audience. As the Internet is especially popular with today's youth, organizations such as al-Shabaab are using online forums and chat rooms to recruit young followers. Al-Shabaab's official website, which has since been taken down, featured posts, videos and official statements in English, Arabic and Somali, as well as online classrooms to educate followers.[67] Prior to its expulsion from Mogadishu in mid-2011, al-Shabaab had also launched the Al-Kataib propaganda television station the year before. The channel's pilot program aired the confessions of Ahmed Kisi, an alleged CIA spy who had been executed earlier in the week.[68]

In addition, al-Shabaab also uses music to influence and appeal to young followers. According to Robin Wright, "By 2010, almost eight out of every ten soldiers in Somalia's many rebel forces were children," who are especially influenced and susceptible messages conveyed to modern, western-themed music.[69] One of al-Shabaab's foreign-born leaders, American Omar Hammami, a.k.a. Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki, gained notoriety after an April 2009 video of him rapping about jihad.[70] Hammami's most recent song, "Send Me a Cruise", debuted online on April 9, 2011.[71]

In October 2013, al-Shabaab issued a propaganda video targeting several British Muslims who had spoken out against Islamist extremism, some of them explicitly against the murder of Lee Rigby.[72] The video urged jihadists in the UK to follow the example of Rigby's killers, to arm themselves if necessary with knives from B&Q.[72] The Muslims named in the video for "selling out"[73] included Mohammed Shafiq, Mohammed Ansar, Usama Hasan and Ajmal Masroor.[72]

In February 2015, al-Shabaab released another propaganda video calling for attacks on shopping malls in Canada, the UK, and the US, including the West Edmonton Mall in Alberta, Canada, and the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota.[74] Although the group had hitherto only ever launched attacks within East Africa, security at both malls was tightened in response.[75] The Royal Canadian Mounted Police also indicated that there was no evidence of any imminent threat.[74]

Twitter account[edit]

On December 7, 2011, al-Shabaab also reportedly began using the Twitter social media network. The move is believed to be an attempt by the group to counteract tweets by allied officials, and to serve as a venue for the dissemination of information on alleged casualties as well as a way to interact with the press.[76] The account, HSMPress, has attracted over eight thousand followers for its witty taunts of the KDF in general and its official spokesman, Maj. Emmanuel Chirchir, with whom it has frequent exchanges, in particular.[77][78] There have been major efforts in the last few years to block the groups access to media because it’s been their largest outreach methods.[78]

For example, after Chirchir upbraided the Shabaab for not letting women in the areas under their control wear bras, saying life had more to offer, HSMPress retorted "Like bombing donkeys, you mean!", referring to a recent announcement by Chirchir that any large group of loaded donkeys would be considered a target. "Your eccentric battle strategy has got animal rights groups quite concerned, Major."[79] Later, responding to Chirchir's claim that Kismayo had been captured by the KDF, HSMPress said the Kenyan "boys are a grotesque parody of an army! They can outpace ur world-class runners by far. Indeed, they 'Run like a Kenyan'".[80] The account shows a less belligerent side with others, telling a UN official who queried "it is good when extremists or perceived extremists come out and talk[..] can we have a coffee with them too?" that "a caramel macchiato would do!"[81]

While it is not known for certain if the HSMPress account is sanctioned by the Shabaab, both Western and African Union officials believe that it is. It has relayed information about battle outcomes that has sometimes been more accurate than its opponents, and posted pictures of authentic identity cards of missing AMISOM peacekeepers that were presumably killed in combat. The account itself is operated by a man with the nom de guerre Sheik Yoonis, who has in the past responded to press questions during telephone interviews in a "clipped British accent".[77]

Most of al-Shabaab's messages on Twitter are in English, with authorities suggesting that they are intended for an outside audience and potential recruits in the West. Officials in the United States, where Twitter is based, are exploring legal ways to terminate the account, although they acknowledge that doing so might raise free speech concerns.[82] Chirchir commented in a tweet of his own that such a move would be counterproductive, as "al-Shabaab needs to be engaged positively, and Twitter is the only avenue."[83]

In January 2013, Twitter suspended al-Shabaab's English-language account.[84][85] This was apparently in response to the account having issued death threats against Frenchman "Denis Allex" and subsequently posted photos of his corpse after the botched Bulo Marer hostage rescue attempt, as well as tweeting threats to kill Kenyan hostages.[85][86] Al-Shabaab later opened a new Twitter account on February 4, 2013.[86] Twitter closed the account again on September 6, 2013 for unspecified reasons. A few days earlier, on September 3, the insurgent group had used the service to claim responsibility for an unsuccessful ambush attempt against a convoy carrying Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The militants also tweeted after the attack that the group had no other active Twitter feeds in English, and cautioned users against "parody accounts". The insurgent group also messaged that "next time, you won't be as lucky," in apparent violation of Twitter's user policies against issuing threats of violence and using the service for illicit purposes or activities. However, al-Shabaab's Arabic-language account remained open.[85] The group later relaunched its English Twitter account on September 11, 2013.[87]

[88]

In September 2013, Twitter suspended at least six al-Shabaab accounts after the outfit ridiculed the Kenyan government's response to the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, an attack al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for. The group later re-opened a Twitter account in December, with the explanation that "the aim is to vigorously challenge defamatory reports in the media by presenting an accurate portrayal of the current state of Jihad in Somalia and countering Western, state-sponsored propaganda machines that are paid to demonise the Mujahideen." A Somali government spokesman stated that the Somali authorities were opposed to al-Shabaab's presence on the social media website, as the group "should not be given the platform to mislead the youth".       

Plastic bag ban[edit]

     In July 2018, al-Shabaab announced a complete ban on single-use plastic bags within its territory in a broadcast as they "pose a serious threat to the well-being of humans and animals alike," whilst also forbidding the logging of several species of rare trees in the same announcement. [89] Some have argued that, whilst these environment-conscious advances are welcome, they are overshadowed by the group's terrorist activities, whilst others have mocked the United States and other countries for taking less action on climate change than a terrorist group. [90] This follows the Taliban's message from 2017 to "plant one or several fruit or non-fruit trees for the beautification of Earth and the benefit of almighty Allah's creations." A spokesman for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, Shah Hussain Murtazawi described these environmentally friendly messages as an attempt to deceive public opinion and to distract from the Taliban's "crimes and destruction". [91] The groups has used these environmentally conscious issues like the banning of plastic bags to try to make someone kind of good image in the publics eye. They do so by trying to offset the fact that they are a terrorist organization.

     

Relations with other militant groups[edit]

Al-Qaeda[edit]

On February 9, 2012, Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair "Godane" announced in a fifteen-minute video message that al-Shabaab would be joining the militant Islamist organization al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zubair stated, "On behalf of the soldiers and the commanders in al-Shabaab, we pledge allegiance to you. So lead us to the path of jihad and martyrdom that was drawn by our imam, the martyr Osama."[92] Al-Zawahiri approved and welcomed al-Shabaab as al-Qaeda's Somalia-based affiliate in a 15-minute video response, stating "Today, I have glad tidings for the Muslim Ummah that will please the believers and disturb the disbelievers, which is the joining of the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement in Somalia to Qaeda al-Jihad, to support the jihadi unity against the Zio-Crusader campaign and their assistants amongst the treacherous agent rulers."[93] The merger follows reports about a rift in the leadership,[94] and it coincides with reports about large factions breaking away from al-Shabaab[95] and up to 500 al-Shabaab fighters fleeing or leaving southern Somalia for Yemen,[96] where a full Al Qaeda branch AQAP is stepping up operations, under perceived increased military pressure since a new president took office.[97] Somalia's Transitional Federal Government officially recognized the two Islamist groups as one group.[98]

A poll conducted between 8–16 April 2012 by the international market research company YouGov examined the views of MENA region residents with regard to the news of the merger. The combined group evoked fear in most respondents, with 42% believing that the merger announcement ought to be a source of alarm for the international community; 23% of polltakers felt very strongly about this. 45% of respondents believed that the fusion of the two groups would enhance Al-Qaeda's attempts at recruiting new operatives, with 12% indicating that the merger would strengthen the latter group's capabilities and another 11% believing that it would result in more terrorist attacks on the continent. A further 55% of pollsters did not know how the Somali leadership would respond to news of the merger, though 36% suggested that it would lead to more movements against al-Shabaab by the Somali military. 34% of respondents also indicated that announcement of the merger constituted a propaganda effort aimed at securing more coverage for the two Islamist groups, with 30% of polltakers believing that the decision to merge shows that both al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are under duress.[99]

In response to Godane's announced name change and merger with al-Qaeda, all other Shabaab top leaders called a conference in Baidabo.[100] They refused to adopt the new name (al-Qaeda in East Africa) and they agreed on a new policy, focusing entirely on domestic issues and with no mention any more of international struggle. One significant policy proposal was to form a national, independent Shura of Islamic clerics, which means also independent of al-Qaeda. With it, they seem to try to remove some obstacles for reaching an entente with their Sufi opponents, and to avoid getting targeted by US drones.[101][102] Aweys later declared that: "Al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda are merely a small part of the larger Islamic group and al-Qaeda's ideology should not be viewed as the sole, righteous path for Islam."[103]

This open revolt against al-Qaeda made it more likely that al-Shabaab would slowly become ready for some sort of negotiated entente.[104] On February 23, 2012, while Shabaab was pushed out of several strongholds, Radio Magadishu reported that 120 al-Qaeda leaders and followers fled from Kismayo to Yemen.[105] Aweys was appointed military commander of Kismayo and the south.[106]

By 2013, the internal rifts within al-Shabaab erupted into all-out warfare between Godane's faction and those of other leaders in the organization. In late June, four senior Shabaab commanders were executed under the orders of Godane. One of these commanders was Ibrahim al-Afghani, who had complained about the leadership style of Godane in a letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Sixteen others were arrested, and Aweys fled.[107] He was later taken into custody in Mogadishu by Somali government forces.[108] On 12 September, Omar Hammami, who had left the group due to significant disagreements with Godane, was killed by al-Shabaab forces. The Westgate shopping mall shooting in September was said by Simon Tisdall to be a reflection of the power struggle within the insurgent group, with Godane's hardline global jihadi faction seeking to exert its authority.[109]

   

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******* COMMENTS *********

I took the time to look at your article on the main page and I see that it is very lengthy, so it is obviously hard to find new information to add in. The direction and details that you want to add in are great. If I had any suggestions it would be to create a rough draft of what you actually plan on writing in your article. Right now all that I can see is your outline that you created in part on of the roadmap series. A rough draft will help the edits that you want to make be more thought out. For now, I suggest on perhaps finding other leaders that attended the camp, maybe post in some screenshots of the group’s social media posts, or even more information on how the group was founded. In the section where it lists countries that have deemed this group as a terrorist organization, you could even list why they consider them to be terrorist, or include a short summary of commonalities the countries have in reasons for why they are deemed as such in those regions. Another idea I could suggest for content is maybe finding locations of where this group trains recruits, or perhaps finding documents or information about their recruiting process or what trainees have to go through. I think these suggestions would give you more to write about in the later stages of forming your draft of what to paste into the article in the final stages. I also suggest some clarity and rewording in the first section above, there seems to be some punctuation missing. I found a great link on information about the group’s history, transformation, and about peace keeping effort in this link here, http://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf

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